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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Volume 47, Number 2, 1972
ARTICLES
THE STATES VERSUS INDIAN
OFF-RESERVATION FISHING: A UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT ERRORf
Ralph W. Johnson*
Pacific Northwest Indian tribes signed treaties with the United
States in the mid-1850's which guaranteed them the permanent right
to fish at their usual and accustomed fishing sites off the reservations.
The Indians believe these treaties mean that those states which did not
exist in 1855 have no power to regulate Indian off-reservation fishing
under any circumstances. State officials, on the other hand, have con-
sistently argued that Indian off-reservation fishing is subject to the
same state regulation as non-Indian fishing. The United States Su-
preme Court has basically accepted the states' position, holding that
states can regulate off-reservation fishing when "necessary for conser-
vation." In 1896, 1905 and again in 1942 the Court, in dictum,
adopted that proposition.' The error was compounded in 1968 in
Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game.2 The question of whether the
states have power to regulate off-reservation fishing was relevant in
t I am indebted to the following persons for reading and commenting upon drafts of
this study: Mr. Edward Weinberg, former solicitor for the Department of the Interior;
Professors Charles E. Corker and Arval Morris of the School of Law; Dr. Gardner
Brown (economic aspects) and Dr. Donald Bevan (fisheries aspects). I am also indebted
to former law students Joel Benoliel, Leo LeClair and Woodrow Wallen, who prepared
research papers on different aspects of the Indian fishing rights question in my Indian
Legal Problems Seminar during 1969-7 1.
* Professor of Law, University of Washington. B.S. in Law, 1947, LL.B., 1949, Uni-
versity of Oregon.
1. Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371
(1905); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942).
2. 391 U.S. 392 (1968).
207
Washington Law Review Vol. 47: 207, 1972
Puyallup, but the Court, as in previous cases, simply reiterated its ear-
lier assumption without analysis of why the states have such power.3
No valid basis for the existence of such state power can be found.
The Constitution of the United States provides that treaties are the
"supreme law of the land." Because agreements with the Indians are
treaties, 4 the Indians are not subject to state regulation unless the
treaty so provides or unless Congress so legislates. The treaties with
the Indians do not provide for state regulation and Congress has never
authorized such regulation. Therefore, the Supreme Court should
clearly hold that the states have no power to regulate Indian
off-reservation fishing unless and until Congress expressly delegates
the power to do so. This problem will be examined in detail.
If the Court nevertheless continues to hold that the states have the
power to regulate off-reservation fishing, it will have started down a
precarious and trouble-strewn path which must be followed to its end.
The Court must create standards to guide the states in the exercise of
their power. Some constraints have already been imposed by the
courts. However, these standards are notoriously vague, 5 and the
states have capitalized on this vagueness to create regulatory patterns
for salmon fishing which consistently deny the Indians substantial
fishing opportunities. Moreover, the vagueness of the case law stan-
dards portends a continuing series of clashes between the Indians and
3. In State v. Moses, 79 Wn.2d 104, 483 P.2d 832 (1971), the Washington Supreme
Court was confronted again with off-reservation fishing rights and noted the lack ofjudi-
cial analysis of the critical "in common" phrase in the treaties. Id. at 108, 483 P.2d at
834. The "in common" language is discussed in text accompanying notes 22-29. infra.
4. That the agreements with the Indians are treaties is too well supported by Su-
preme Court decisions to be questioned. It is sometimes said, however, that these agree-
ments are over 100 years old and are now so ancient they can legitimately be ignored. If
this is true one might argue for the discarding of the United States Constitution, the
Oregon Treaty of 1846 (setting the boundary between the United States and Canada) or
the land grants to the railroads in the mid-1800's.
5. Vagueness poses difficult problems for Indian fishermen who are, under our legal
system, presumed to know the law. That is an awesome task, as will be demonstrated
below. It is attested to by Washington Governor Daniel J. Evans' support of H.B. 1004,
Ist Sess. [Wash. 1971] and H.B. 1005, 1st Sess. [Wash. 1971 ]. These bills were designed
to stop further arrests of Indians and confiscation of fishing gear where the fisherman
contends, in good faith, that he is fishing under a treaty right. A moratorium would have
been declared, presumably until such time as the courts or Congress clarified the law.
The bills died in committee.
In State v. Moses, 79 Wn.2d 104, 483 P.2d 832 (1971), Justice Hale, writing for the
majority, noted the legal confusion concerning Indian treaties, especially concerning
fishing rights:
Evanescent as the morning mists on the shimmering waters of Puget Sound is the
law of Indian treaties. One moment it is there, soon to vanish in a swirl of conflict-
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the states, each seeking to carve out the broadest possible claim in this
legal thicket. But the creation of adequate standards will not be an
easy task. It is not too late for the Court to correct its earlier errors
and remove itself from a field better left to Congress.
Before examining the treaties, the relevant treaty law, the states'
power to regulate, and the lack of adequate regulatory standards, it is
important to understand the factual background of the problem. The
origin of the Indians' right to fish off the reservation does not rest in
the treaties. Its basis is the Indian practice, running from time imme-
morial, of fishing in these locations as a means of livelihood. As "man-
ifest destiny" brought waves of white settlers westward, the Indians
were forced to give up much of the land they had formerly occupied,
hunted, and fished. In the late 1850's the United States signed treaties
with the tribes of the Pacific Northwest in order to define the rights of
this country and its citizens and the rights of the Indians. These
treaties were "not a grant of right to the Indians, but a grant of a right
from them-a reservation of those not granted."'6 One oft-forgotten
aspect of these treaties is that they define the rights and obligations of
the United States and its citizens vis-h-vis the Indians, as well as the
rights of the Indians themselves.
Indians, insisting on recognition of their rights, have been chal-
lenging present interpretations of the treaties.7 Until the late 1950's,
ing, diverging and incomprehensible precedents. Decisions intended to declare the
meaning and to describe the effect and operation of Indian treaties tend in time to
generate a system of judicial vapor trails which obscure more often than elucidate
the treaties under consideration. This is another Indian fishing case that leaves un-
answered more questions than it resolves.
Id. at 104, 483 P.2d at 832. Justice Finley, although dissenting, agreed that "the law of
Indian treaties has suffered from a most disjointed and enigmatic development in pub-
lished opinions of the courts." Id. at 119, 483 P.2d at 840.
6. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
7. It is true that much has happened in the field of Indian related law in the years
since Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). Therein Chief Justice Mar-
shall described the Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations." Id. at 17. Some of the
highlights of this history provide an important background to the fishing rights issues.
In 1835 President Jackson ordered the Indians to move to the West because he felt
that they could not survive living near non-Indians. In ordering them west, he said:
A country west of Missouri and Arkansas has been assigned to them, into which the
white settlements are not to be pushed. No political communities can be formed in
that extensive region, except those which are established by the Indians themselves
or by the United States for them and with their concurrence. A barrier has thus
been raised for their protection against the encroachment of our citizens, and
guarding the Indians as far as possible from those evils which have brought them to
their present condition....
IL COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 260-61 (7th ed. 1963). In 1871 Con-
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Indians tried only occasionally to fish at their off-reservation treaty
fishing sites, since the personal and financial costs of arrest, trial, con-
fiscation of fishing gear, and jail confinement were too high. However,
in recent years their insistence on both cultural and legal independ-
ence has resulted in a series of demonstrations and lawsuits designed
to put an end to the gradual erosion of their way of life. One con-
sequence is that Indians are now fishing in a variety of renewed,
off-reservation locations where they had not fished since the last cen-
tury, and the states, after reexamining the treaties, are consenting to,
or acquiescing in, this action.
Perhaps one cause of the trouble can be attributed to the many
years of relative acceptance by the Indians of state regulation of their
off-reservation fishing rights. During this time the states, rightly or
wrongly, have developed an integrated system of fishery management
which must now be modified if the Indians' claims are to be accom-
modated. But defenses of laches and estoppel are not very persuasive
in light of the economic plight of the Indians and the cost of compe-
tent legal counsel to protect Indian rights.
gress provided that no more treaties should be signed with Indian tribes. Then, in 1881,
President Arthur formally announced a termination policy by proposing the General
Allotment Act (Dawes Act), 25 U.S.C. § 331-32, 348 (1970), by which Indian reserva-
tions would be divided up and deeded to individual Indians, so they "would be per-
suaded to sever their tribal relations and engage at once in agricultural pursuits." See H.
COMMAGER, supra at 556. The Allotment Act system, enacted in 1887, failed miserably.
See Comment, Too Little Land, Too Many Heirs-The Indian Heirship Land Problem,
46 WASH. L. REV. 709 (1971). The Indians were not instructed in agriculture and were
not interested in farming. Indian landholdings were reduced from 138,000,000 acres in
1887 to 48,000,000 by 1934. Hearings on S. 2755 Before the Senate Committee on In-
dian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. 2, pt. I, at 17 (1934). The Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934 recognized this failure and stopped further allotments; it also provided for
Indian self-government by empowering tribes, if they wished, to form corporate
self-governments to deal with the white man's banks, corporations and state and local
governments. This Act resulted in a partial revival of Indian sovereignty and independ-
ence. Then in 1953 House Concurrent Resolution 108 was adopted by Congress, again
formally declaring a termination policy. The Resolution was followed in the same year
by Public Law 280, 18 U.S.C. § 1162; 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1970). Public Law 280 author-
ized various states to assume jurisdiction over certain reservations. The Klamath and
Menominee reservations were terminated within the next few years and various other
reservations are still being considered for dissolution. The termination policy came under
increasing criticism in the 1960's. Federal policy again changed in the late 1960's, culmi-
nating in the formal announcement by President Nixon in July, 1970, opposing the ter-
mination policy, and the introduction in Congress by Senator Jackson and others of
Senate Concurrent Resolution 26 designed to expressly repeal the 1953 termination res-
olution. In the meantime Congress enacted, in 1968, the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25
U.S.C.A. § 1302-03 (1970), which attempted to extend the protections of the Bill of
Rights to Indians in their tribal affairs. The 1968 Act also authorizes the states and the
Indian tribes to agree on "retrocession," i.e., the removing of state jurisdiction over Indian
reservations. Many reservations are now negotiating with the states for retrocession.
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Accommodating the states' fishery management programs with In-
dian claims will be especially difficult due to the chianges in conditions
affecting the fisheries which have taken place during the 120 years
since the treaties were signed. Dams have been built, rivers have been
polluted, and the number of commercial and sports fishermen has
drastically increased.8 These activities have substantially reduced, and
in some cases have destroyed, the salmon runs which the Indians ear-
lier had fished. Moreover, the number of salmon today is considerably
less than it was 120 years ago,9 although precise comparative data is
unavailable since no one kept accurate records in 1855. At present
Indians only catch approximately five percent of the salmon harvested
in Oregon and Washington.' 0 The non-Indian harvest in 1855 prob-
ably did not exceed three to five percent of the harvestable fish.
Even more important than size is the location of today's non-Indian
fishery. Both commercial and sports fishing occurs in the ocean, the
Straits of Juan de Fuca, and Puget Sound, before the fish get to the
traditional Indian fishing sites on their way to their spawning grounds.
When the salmon arrive at the Indian fishing locations along the
streams and rivers, few are left, and they are needed for spawning.
Claims that the Indians can go elsewhere and fish with non-Indians
fail to recognize that the. Indians' economic plight denies them the
technological capacity to compete with non-Indian fishermen at other
locations.
Against this general background, it is now necessary to examine the
treaties guaranteeing Indian fishing rights and the way in which those
treaties have been interpreted by the courts.
8. In 1855 no records were kept of the number of fishermen. General history rec-
ords suggest that the number of non-Indian fishermen was no more than a few dozen.
Recent data shows the following increase in commercial fishing licenses in Washington
and the Puget Sound area:
Type of Fishing Gear 1935 1969
Purse Seine 215 384
Reef Net 20 63
Gill Net 1014 1466
WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES, 1969 FISHERIES STATISTICAL REPORT 87
(1969). The sports fishery was also insignificant in 1855. Between 1946 and 1969 the
sports fishing harvest of Chinook salmon increased from 84,400 fish to 267,100 fish. The
harvest of Coho (Silver) salmon increased from 109,700 to 497,500. Id. at 91.
9. The Washington canned salmon pack for the period 1900 to 1915 averaged close
to 1,000,000 forty-eight pound cans. For the period 1955 through 1969, the average was
approximately 300,000 cans. Id. at 13.
10. Id. at 13, 22, 71.
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I. THE TREATIES
The validity of the Indians' claims of exemption from state regula-
tion depends initially on the interpretation of the language of the
fishing rights treaties. Do these treaties, by their own terms, provide
for eventual state regulation of off-reservation fishing? The answer
can be found only through a careful examination of the treaties them-
selves and the circumstances surrounding their signing.
The basic question concerns what the signers of the treaty meant
when they wrote: "The right of taking fish, at all usual and accus-
tomed grounds and stations, is further secured to said Indians, in
common with all citizens of the Territory."" This language appeared
in the Medicine Creek Treaty, 12 ceding to the United States the terri-
tory of the Nisquallys and Puyallups. Virtually identical language was
included in the Treaty of Point Elliot,' 3 the Yakima Treaty,14 and
other 1855 treaties.' 5 The critical phrase is "in common with all citi-
zens of the territory." It is remarkable that, as important as this lan-
guage is to the Indians' claim, no legal scholar has yet attempted to
explain the Indians' position.
The "in common" language is often cited as the source of the states'
right to regulate Indian fishing. One popular version is that it guaran-
teed to the Indians a right to fish which they otherwise would not have
had; that is, it somehow raised them to a status of equality with the
settlers, giving them the same rights as the settlers had and no more.16
Unfortunately the "in common" language has never been given the
11. Treaty with the Nisquallys (Medicine Creek Treaty), December 26, 1854, art.
Il1, 10 Stat. 1132(1855).
12. Id.
13. Treaty with the Duwamish Indians, January 22, 1855, art. V, 12 Stat. 927
(1863). The Indians now living on the Muckleshoot Reservation were also party to these
treaties and are entitled to the fishing rights defined in them, although the Muckleshoot
Reservation was created by Executive Order rather than Treaty.
14. Treaty with the Yakimas, June 9, 1855, art. III, para. 2, 12 Stat. 951 (1863).
15. Treaty with Tribes of the Middle Oregon, June 25, 1855, art. i, 12 Stat. 963
(1863); Treaty with the Walla Walla, June 9, 1855, art. 1, 12 Stat. 945 (1855); Treaty with
the Nez Perces, June I1, 1855, art. III, 12 Stat. 957 (1863).
16. In United States v. Oregon (SoHappy v. Smith), 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Ore.
1969), the state of Oregon contended that this language meant that the state must deny
the Indians the right to fish at a given location unless it also allowed non-Indians to fish
there with the same gear, on the ground that the equal protection clause of the Constitu-
tion prohibited special treatment for Indians. The trial court rejected the theory as "fan-
tastic." Id. (oral opinion of Judge Belloni). The court said that the treaties clearly per-
mitted the Indians to fish at different locations and with different gear than the
non-Indians, and that such provisions are clearly constitutional. In other words, the
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careful consideration by the courts that it deserves. 17 It cannot be ra-
tionally interpreted merely to put Indians on an equal basis with set-
tlers.
It must be remembered that these treaties were not grants from the
United States to the Indians. They were mutual agreements between
two parties, in which the Indians granted certain rights to the settlers
and the settlers guaranteed certain rights to the Indians. Read in this
light, and in light of the circumstances of the time, the meaning of the
"in common" language becomes clear. By this phrase the Indians
granted to the non-Indians the right to fish with them at the tradi-
tional sites. Therefore, "in common with" means "as well as to." Al-
though this language does not prevent non-Indians through their own
government from prohibiting themselves from fishing at the tradi-
tional sites,' 8 it does prohibit the Indians from thereafter denying
non-Indians the right to fish there. As the Washington Supreme Court
said in State v. Satiacum: "[W] e believe that the phrase 'in common
with [all] citizens to the Territory' merely granted the white settlers
and their heirs and/or grantees a right to fish at these places with the
Indians."' 9
This construction is reinforced by recalling the situation that ex-
isted in 1855 when the treaties were signed. At that time it was
thought that timber, fish, clean water, and even land existed in such
abundance that no one need be concerned about eventual depletion.
The salmon runs were so large, and the number of fishermen so small,
that only a small fraction of the harvestable fish were taken by anyone
-Indians or otherwise. The state of Washington was not created until
1889. The creation of a state, and the ensuing population explosion,
states have power to regulate non-Indians differently than Indians because non-Indians
have no treaty rights vis-A-vis their own government. The constitutionality of such spe-
cial regulations is carefully analyzed in Comment, State Power and the Indian Treaty
Right to Fish, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 485, 498 (1971).
17. The Washington Supreme Court in State v. Moses, 79 Wn.2d 104, 108, 483 P.2d
832, 834 (1971), still felt constrained to say: "Surprisingly little judicial attention ...
has been given to this rather standard treaty language."
18. Non-Indians sometimes argue that if the Indians can rely on the treaties to
avoid state regulation then so can the non-Indians, because the United States signed the
treaties on their behalf. See note 16, supra. But this does not follow. The non-Indians
have empowered their governments to regulate their fishing, and those governments are
restrained in that regulation only by their own constitutions and laws. A state regulation
prohibiting non-Indian fishing at a given location, whether an Indian fishing site or not,
does not violate the treaty rights of the non-Indians. It has nothing to do with those treaty
rights.
19. 50 Wn.2d 513, 523, 314 P.2d 400, 406 (1957).
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technological development, dam construction, river pollution, and
extensive non-Indian fishing requiring comprehensive salmon manage-
ment were certainly not foreseen. Hydroelectric power had not been
conceived of. No salmon canning occurred anywhere on the West Coast
in 1855 or for many years thereafter. 20 As the Washington court said
in Satiacum, there is no reason to believe the Indians "anticipated the
future sovereign to limit them. 21
These circumstances have an obvious bearing upon the construc-
tion of the treaty language. They also aid in an understanding of the
purpose of the treaties, and in Winters v. United States22 and Arizona
v. California23 the Court made it clear that Indian treaties should be
construed to effect the purposes for which they were signed. Winters
arose out of an Indian claim to water rights on a reservation in Mon-
tana, where the treaty establishing the reservation made no mention of
water at all. When the Indians agreed to settle on a specific arid desert
tract and give up their roaming, hunting, and foraging, they under-
standably assumed that water would be available for irrigation. If they
got only desert land without water then the treaty was a fraud. The
Court held that the Indians were entitled to all the water necessary to
irrigate the reservation, state laws and state-created water rights to
the contrary notwithstanding. Such a right was construed to be an
implied term of the treaty. This doctrine was affirmed in Arizona v.
California, where the Court held that the Indians were entitled to an
amount of water measured not by the number of Indians living on the
reservation, but by the amount of irrigable reservation land.
What, then, was the purpose of the 1855 treaties? Both Indians and
settlers realized that the Indians' freedom to move about across the
land was coming to an end. The pressures of "civilization" from the
immigrating settlers and from the Anglo-Saxon system of land owner-
ship required that the Indians live on specific tracts of land. The In-
dians knew this. Both sides realized, too, that in order to provide the
Indians with a continuing means of livelihood-clearly one of the
main purposes of the treaties-the land reserved to the Indians had to
be so located that they could continue their principal means of liveli-
20. R. VAN CLEVE & R. JOHNSON, MANAGEMENT OF THE HIGH SEAS FISHERIES OF THE
NORTHEASTERN PACIFIC 15 (1963).
21. Satiacum, 50 Wn.2d 513,522, 314 P.2d 400, 405 (1957).
22. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
23. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
214
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hood, fishing. The United States Supreme Court, at a time much
closer to the treaty date than the present, recognized that " [t] he right
to resort to the fishing places in controversy was a part of larger rights
possessed by the Indians, upon the exercise of which there was not a
shadow of impediment, and which were not much less necessary to the
existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed. 24 Be-
cause the reservations set aside were not large enough to include all of
the Indians' traditional fishing sites, the teaties guaranteed the In-
dians the right to continue taking fish off their newly established reser-
vations.
Winters requires that this purpose of providing the Indians a con-
tinuing means of livelihood by guaranteeing their off-reservation
fishing rights must be given effect in the construction of the treaties.
The case for the Indians is even stronger here than in Winters because
the Indian fishing rights, unlike the water rights, were explicitly pre-
served in the treaties. It is unrealistic to argue that these off-reservation
sites were somehow to be less secure than the on-reservation sites, the
latter being concededly beyond state regulation. The treaties neither
stated nor implied such a rule.25
Under this construction of the treaties, a clear conflict exists be-
tween the states' regulatory schemes and the Indians' treaty rights.
The Constitution requires the state regulations to yield.
II. TREATY LAW
Under the United States Constitution the states should have no
power to regulate Indian off-reservation, treaty-protected fishing.
That document provides that the "Constitution . . . of the United
States . . . and all Treaties . . . made, under the Authority of the
24. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
25. It is important to remember that the treaties with the Pacific Northwest Indians
were written in the English language, a language unfamiliar to the Indians. The treaties
were explained to the Indians in the Chinook jargon, a limited trade language of some
300 words which in no sense could be considered adequate to explain the precise
meaning of the agreements to the Indians. Thus the Indians had to rely upon the good
faith of the white treaty drafters to write into the treaties the rights the Indians were told,
and assumed, they were getting. The courts have often recognized the need to construe
treaties with the Indians as the Indians fairly understood them. See AMERICAN FRIENDS
SERVICE COMMITTEE, UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY: FISHING RIGHTS OF THE MUCKLESHOOT,
PUYALLUP, AND NISQUALLY INDIANS 23 (1970); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371,
380-81 (1905), Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 406 (1968).
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United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. '2 6 A state has no
power to amend the United States Constitution, nor can it amend or
abrogate a treaty entered into between this nation and some other na-
tion,27 or with an Indian tribe.28 Where state law comes into conflict
with a treaty, the state law must give way. 29 The treaties establishing
Indian off-reservation fishing rights are self-executing, requiring no im-
plementation by federal legislation. 30 Treaties can be renegotiated by
the original parties. 31 Also, Congress may unilaterally abrogate either
part or all of a treaty without the consent of the other party.32 Con-
gress has not done so, however, with regard to Indian off-reservation
fishing rights.
The basic doctrine with respect to the conflict between state laws
and treaties was established in Missouri v. Holland.33 In 1916 the
United States entered into a treaty with Great Britain 34 for the pro-
tection and management of migratory waterfowl. The State of Mis-
souri challenged a federal statute designed to implement that treaty.
The Supreme Court rejected the state's challenge, saying that the
treaty overrode state law: "Valid treaties of course are as binding
within the territorial limits of the States as they are elsewhere
throughout the dominion of the United States." 35 Underlying the
Court's rationale was the premise that: "To allow the legislation of the
subordinate political entities [states] to negate treaties would contra-
26. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
27. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
28. In Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832) the Supreme Court declared void a
Georgia statute that attempted to change a treaty right of the Cherokee Nation. Chief
Justice Marshall held that the state was powerless to enact laws affecting the
treaty-created reservation, saying: "The whole intercourse between the United States
and this nation, is, by our Constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United
States." Id. at 560-61.
29. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
30. Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968).
31. See Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902); Lone Wolf v. Hitch-
cock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
32. It is generally conceded that the United States has plenary power to abrogate
Indian treaties. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). But this says no more
than is true of treaties with France, Great Britain, or any other nation. The Supreme
Court has, however, recognized the important status of treaties and has said that if Con-
gress wishes to abrogate one it must do so explicitly; a treaty right will not be affected
by implication. Menominee v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
33. 252 U.S- 416 (1920).
34. Convention with Great Britain, August 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702, T. S. No. 628.
35. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. at 434 (1920).
216
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dict the idea of national sovereignty expressive of the purposes of
union."36
In Menominee v. United States,37 the Menominee Indians sued in
the Court of Claims for the loss of their hunting and fishing rights,
which the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in an earlier case,38 had held
had been abrogated by the Menominee Termination Act of 1954.39
The Termination Act had not mentioned these rights. Public Law
280, of 1953, which the Wisconsin court said should be read in pari
materia with the Termination Act, had provided that: "Nothing in
this ... [Act] shall deprive any Indian or Indian tribe, band, or
community of any right, privilege, or immunity afforded under federal
treaty, agreement, or statute with respect to hunting, trapping, or
fishing or the control, licensing, or regulation thereof."40 The Court
rejected the rationale of the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision: "We
decline to construe the Termination Act as a backhanded way of ab-
rogating the hunting and fishing rights of these Indians. While the
power to abrogate these rights exists. . . 'the intention to abrogate or
modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to Congress.' "41 If the
Court meant what it said, then neither Oregon nor Washington can
regulate Indian fishing rights unless Congress clearly empowers them
to do so. It has not done that. In fact, the principal statement by Con-
gress on the question of fishing rights, Public Law 280, has just the
opposite effect.42
The recent Michigan Supreme Court decision in People v. Jon-
dreau43 affirms this principle. The court held that Michigan fishing
regulations do not apply to a Chippewa Indian fishing in Keweenaw
Bay on Lake Superior and that it was immaterial whether the waters
36. W. GOULD, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 331 (1957).
37. 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
38. State v. Sanapaw, 21 Wis.2d 377, 124 N.W.2d 41 (1963). Wisconsin prosecuted
three Menominees for violating state fishing regulations and the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that the State regulations were valid, as the hunting and fishing rights had
been abrogated by the Menominee Termination Act.
39. 25 U.S.C. §§ 891-902 (1970).
40. 18U.S.C.§ 1162 (1970).
41. Menominee, 391 U.S. at 412-13, citing Pigeon River v. Cox, 291 U.S. 138, 160
(1934).
42. The Senate hlso considered the question of off-reservation fishing rights in 1964,
in SJ. Res. 170, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). That resolution would have explicitly rec-
ognized the existence of such rights and made them subject to state regulation. SJ. Res.
171, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), introduced at the same time, would have extinguished
those rights by purchase. After hearings, both resolutions died in Committee.
43. 384 Mich. 539, 185 N.W.2d 375 (1971).
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in question were on the reservation or off. The right to fish was ex-
pressly reserved in the Chippewa treaty. The court rejected the argu-
ment that state regulation was justified because of the necessity of
managing the fishery, quoting with approval from an Idaho opinion: 44
We are not here concerned with the wisdom of the provisions of the
treaty under present conditions nor with the advisability of imposing
upon the Indians certain regulatory obligations in the interest of con-
serving wild life; that is for the Federal Government, the affected
tribe, and perhaps the State of Idaho to resolve under appropriate
negotiations; our concern here is only with reference to protecting the
rights of the Indians which they reserved under the Treaty of 1855 to
hunt upon open and unclaimed land without limitation, restriction or
burden.
The Washington Supreme Court came to the same conclusion in State
v. Satiacum, saying that the off-reservation fishing right of the Indians
was not subject to "state regulation, so long as the right shall not have
been abrogated by the United States. '45
Under these well-established rules, the view of the United States
Supreme Court that states can regulate Indian off-reservation fishing
because of the necessity for conservation is not tenable. First, the
treaties cannot be rationally interpreted to contain such an exception.
But even if such an exception is held to exist, state regulation is not
necessary for conservation. The argument to the contrary rests upon
the fallacy that if the states cannot regulate the Indians then no one
can, and the salmon will be overfished and wiped out. The fact is that
if Indian fishing does pose a real threat to the salmon then Congress
has authority to regulate this fishing. Federal legislation could estab-
lish appropriate standards and encourage cooperation between the
Indians and the states. The National Marine Fisheries Service is a fed-
eral agency with sufficient expertise in the field of salmon manage-
ment to implement any federal legislation. The Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs might also assist in such an enterprise. This solution not only
would be consistent with the treaties and the law of the land but also
would have an important practical advantage. One can reasonably
assume that both the states and the Indians would like some clear
44. Jondreau, 185 N.W.2d at 380, citing State v. Arthur, 74 Idaho 251, 264, 261
P.2d 135, 142(1953).
45. 5OWn.2d 513,524, 314 P.2d 400, 406 (1957).
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definition of their rights in this areA. Rational negotiations between
the groups are not feasible now because of the uncertainty of the
rights involved and the fear of conceding too much. Once these rights
are known more productive negotiation should be possible.
Nevertheless, the Court has permitted the states to regulate
off-reservation fishing when "necessary for conservation." The next
part of this article traces the development of this doctrine.
III. HOW TO CREATE A BODY OF LAW BY ACCIDENT
The legal relation of off-reservation Indian fishing rights to state
regulation is contained in four United States Supreme Court cases, 46
two Ninth Circuit decisions,47 one federal district court case,48 and
five state supreme court decisions.49 The four Supreme Court cases
present a tragic tale of a court that has accidentally, while deciding
other issues, created a body of law authorizing state regulation of In-
dian fishing rights. None of the opinions has ever explored the basis or
implications of this dicta-based rule. Contributing to this state of af-
fairs is the fact that the United States, as guardian and trustee of the
Indians' rights, conceded the Indians' best position without argument
in the one recent case where the issue might have been directly pre-
sented.50 The discussion of these cases is organized chronologically to
demonstrate the accidental approach by which the Court has arrived
at a rule that the states could regulate Indian off-reservation fishing
rights, a rule which has generated confusion among lower federal and
state courts.
The earliest case is Ward v. Race Horse.51 Race Horse, a Bannock
Indian living on a reservation in Idaho, sought a writ of habeas corpus
in a federal court after his arrest in Wyoming for killing seven elk in that
46. Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S.
371 (1905); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942); and Puyallup Tribe v. Depart-
ment of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968).
47. Makah Tribe v. Schoettler, 192 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1951); and Maison v. Confed-
erated Tribes, 314 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1963).
48. United States v. Oregon (SoHappy v. Smith), 302 F.Supp. 899 (D. Ore. 1969).
49. State v. Arthur, 74 Idaho 251, 261 P.2d 135 (1953); State v. Satiacum, 50 Wn.2d
513, 314 P.2d 400 (1957); State v. McCoy, 63 Wn.2d 421, 387 P.2d 942 (1963); People
v. Jondreau, 384 Mich. 539, 185 N.W.2d 375 (1971); State v. Moses, 79 Wn.2d 104, 483
P.2d 832 (1971).
50. Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968). See notes 76-78
and accompanying text, infra.
51. 163 U.S. 504 (1896).
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state in violation of Wyoming game laws. He claimed he was hunting
under an 1869 treaty which provided that "[the Indians] shall have
the right to hunt on the unoccupied lands of the United States so long
as game may be found thereon, and so long as peace subsists among
the Whites and Indians on the borders of the hunting districts." 52
Wyoming was admitted to the Union in 1890. The Court reversed a
lower court decision that had granted habeas corpus, on the ground
that the treaty right had expired and that Race Horse was subject to
the Wyoming game laws. The Court stated that the treaty clause was
intended, by its own terms, to create only a temporary right, existing
only so long as hunting districts were maintained on unoccupied fed-
eral lands. The hunting districts were terminated when Wyoming be-
came a state, and this automatically ended the treaty right.
The Race Horse case is often cited for the proposition that state
game laws apply to treaty-based off-reservation Indian hunting and
fishing rights. It does not stand for that principle, however, because
according to the Court, the treaty hunting right terminated upon state-
hood. Since it no longer existed, the state was not regulating a treaty
right and the Indians were subject to the same state regulations as
others.
United States v. Winans53 was a suit by the United States on behalf
of certain Yakima Indians, and by the Indians themselves, to enjoin
Winans and other white landowners from obstructing Indians fishing at
their usual and accustomed fishing sites. Defendants claimed that the
Indians' right continued only so long as the land was owned by the fed-
eral government. This argument was rejected. The Court held the Indians
had an easement, even over land patented earlier by the United States
to private owners, if this land included the Indians' usual and accus-
tomed fishing site. State regulation of Indian fishing was not involved
in the case. It was, however, mentioned somewhat casually where the
court said:54
[S] urely it was within the competency of the Nation to secure to the
Indians such a remnant of the great rights they possessed as "taking
fish at all usual and accustomed places." Nor does it restrain the State
52. Treaty with the Shoshonees and Bannocks, July 3, 1868, art. IV, 15 Stat. 673
(1868).
53. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
54. Id. at 384.
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unreasonably, if at all, in the regulatioii of the right. It only fixes in the
land such easements as enables the right to be exercised.
Since Winans did not involve an attempt by the state to regulate
Indian fishing rights, no question of the effect of a treaty on the states'
regulatory power was presented. The solitary sentence alluding to the
state's "regulation of the right" was made without benefit of argument
and without any indication that the Court had considered the impli-
cations of such a rule.
In Tulee v. Washington55 the Court held that the state could not
require an Indian exercising his off-reservation treaty fishing rights to
purchase a license. In dicta, the Court volunteered:56
[W] hile the treaty leaves the state with power to impose on Indians
equally with others such restrictions of a purely regulatory nature con-
cerning the time. and manner of fishing outside the reservation as are
necessary for the conservation of fish, it forecloses the state from
charging the Indians a fee of the kind in question here.
The states have argued that this controversial language put the Indians
under state regulation on an equal basis with other citizens. Indians
have argued that the language was dicta at best, that the Court held
the state licensing requirement invalid as to the Indians, and that a
careful reading of the entire opinion suggests the conclusion that the
Indians cannot be regulated as other citizens. The Tulee decision, the
Indians argue, must be limited to its facts. The Idaho Supreme Court
in 1953 took this position in concluding that Idaho could not regulate
the Indian fishing right.57 Four of eight justices of the Washington
Supreme Court interpreted Tulee the same way in 1957.58
One thing is clear. The statement in Tulee that Indian fishing can
be regulated by the state "as. . . necessary for the conservation of
fish" was dictum. Furthermore, this statement was not founded upon
a careful examination of the law governing treaty interpretation, nor
upon an analysis of the meaning of the "in common" language. 59 Al-
55. 315 U.S. 681 (1942).
56. Id. at 684.
57. State v. Arthur, 74 Idaho 251, 261 P.2d 135 (1953). See notes 63-67 and accom-
panying text, infra.
58. State v. Satiacum, 50 Wn.2d 513, 314 P.2d 400 (1957). See notes 68-69 and
accompanying text, infra.
59. See notes 27-29 and accompanying text, supra.
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though the language cannot be lightly dismissed, it cannot be said to
be determinative of the issue.
Between Tulee, in 1942, and Puyallup Tribe v. Department of
Game, in 1968,60 the Court did not address itself to the question of
off-reservation Indian fishing rights. Other courts did. The Idaho
Supreme Court, in State v. Arthur,6' carefully analyzed the law and held
that an Indian who hunted under an off-reservation treaty right was
not subject to Idaho hunting laws. The court said the hunting right
could not be abrogated except by "the consent of ... [the] Indians or
by positive act on the part of the federal government extinguishing the
right .... ,,62 It noted that under Tulee the State of Washington could
not charge the Indians a license fee for the exercise of off-reservation
fishing rights and stated that a $2.00 license fee would be "less
onerous upon the affected Indian tribes than the enactment of legisla-
tion under the claimed police power limiting the killing of game or
prohibiting fishing in certain areas or doing either during certain times
of the year."63 To allow the state to exercise such power "would mean
that at certain times of the year his otherwise ancient right recognized
by the treaty and never extinguished would for all practical purposes
be extinguished. If the position of the State is sustained the assurance
given by Governor Stevens ... is no right at all .... This was never
intended under the broad, fair, and liberal construction of the treaty. ' '14
In State v. Satiacum65 four justices of the Washington Supreme
Court accepted the reasoning of the Arthur court and held that the
criminal charges of fishing in violation of state law which had been
filed against Robert Satiacum, a Puyallup Indian, were properly dis-
missed because the Treaty of Medicine Creek of 1855 is the supreme
law of the land and cannot be modified or abrogated by state law. The
court held that the treaty rights can only be changed by act of Con-
gress or by voluntary abandonment by the Puyallup Indians. 66
60. 391 U.S. 392 (1968).
61. State v. Arthur, 74 Idaho 251, 261 P.2d 135 (1953).
62. Id., 261 P.2d at 142.
63. Id.
64. Id., 261 P.2d at 143.
65. 50 Wn.2d 513, 314 P.2d 400 (1957).
66. The court discussed at length prior decisions such as Tulee, Winans, and Arthur,
and noted that the state's argument to the effect that the "in common" phrase made the
Indians subject to state regulations like other citizens had been "rejected by the courts."
Satiacuin, 50 Wn.2d at 522, 314 P.2d at 405.
Justice Donworth, in three opinions, consistently argued against the power of the state
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has twice dealt with the
question of Indian off-reservation fishing rights. In Makah Tribe v.
Schoettler,67 the Makah tribe brought suit to enjoin the Director of
the Washington State Department of Fisheries from enforcing regula-
tions against the Makahs which would prevent fishing at their accus-
tomed grounds on the Hoko River. The Court of Appeals reversed a
federal district court decision dismissing the suit. Citing Tulee, the
court held that the state could regulate the Indian fishery as necessary
for conservation, but that the state had not sustained its burden of
proving that the regulations in question were necessary for conserva-
tion.68 In Maison v. Confederated Tribes,69 the Indians brought suit
against the Oregon Game Commission and state law enforcement
officials seeking an injunction and a declaratory judgment that Ore-
gon laws regulating salmon and steelhead fishing violated their treaty
rights. The Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court decision which had
issued the injunction after the state failed to carry the burden of
proving that its regulations were necessary for conservation. The court
said that such regulations had to be "indispensable" and not merely
"reasonable" for conservation, pointing out that although reasonable-
ness was all that was required when the state established regulations
for non-Indians the test for regulating Indians was more stringent.70
Neither Schoettler nor Maison gave any consideration to whether the
Indians' treaty right was completely beyond state regulation.
to regulate Indian fishing, maintaining that under the federal constitution, the treaty was
the supreme law of the land and would continue to be "until: (1) the treaty is modified
or abrogated by Congress, or (2) the treaty is voluntarily abandoned by the Puyallup
tribe, or (3) the supreme court of the United States reverses or modifies our decision in
this case." State v. Satiacum, 50 Wn.2d 513, 529, 314 P.2d 400, 410 (1957) (with the
majority); State v. McCoy, 63 Wn.2d 421, 441, 387 P.2d 942, 954 (1963) (dissenting);
and Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 70 Wn.2d 245, 263, 422 P.2d 754,
765 (1967) (dissenting).
Four additional justices concurred in the dismissal in Satiacum on the ground that
although the state could regulate Indian off-reservation fishing as "necessary for conser-
vation" it had failed to demonstrate such necessity. 50 Wn.2d at 530, 314 P.2d at 410.
67. 192 F.2d 224(9th Cir. 1951).
68. The state's argument that "because the state of Washington has the regulatory
power to close the Hoko to citizens of the United States having no treaty rights to fish
there, it has the same power to close the stream to the Makahs having such a treaty" was
explicitly rejected. Id. at 226. See notes 16-18 and accompanying text, supra. The court
noted that "[t] he Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Indian treaty fishing
provisions accord to them rights against state interference which do not exist for other
citizens." Id.
69. 314 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1963).
70. Id. at 174. This "indispensable" test was later rejected by the United States
Supreme Court in Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 401 (1968).
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In State v. McCoy,71 five justices of the Washington Supreme
Court held that a Swinomish Indian, fishing at a usual and accus-
tomed fishing ground, was subject to state regulations. The trial court
had applied the Arthur rule, saying that such Indian fishing was not
subject to state regulation. In reversing the trial court, the majority, in
an opinion astonishing for its misconceptions about treaty law, Indi-
ans, and history, said that the treaty with the Indians was simply a
"real estate transaction"72 where "[t] he United States was buying and
the Indians were selling the aboriginal right of use and occupancy to
the Washington Territory, '73 and that all the Indians reserved with
respect to off-reservation fishing rights was an easement to and from
their traditional sites. Because Washington was admitted to the Union
on "equal footing" 74 with the original states, the court said the state
had the same inherent sovereign power as the original states to regu-
late fish and game harvesting unless there was a "clear and unequiv-
ocal expression of Congressional will by Congress," otherwise.7 "
Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game76 was decided by the
United States Supreme Court in 1968. 77 The Washington Department
of Game brought suit for declaratory relief and for an injunction
against Puyallup and Nisqually Indians to prevent them from fishing
in the Nisqually and Puyallup rivers in violation of state regulations.
Although many briefs were filed raising the question of the right of the
71. 63 Wn.2d 421, 387 P.2d 942 (1963).
72. Id. at 435, 387 P.2d at 951.
73. Id. at 436, 387 P.2d at 951.
74. The "equal footing" doctrine played a small part in the Court's reasoning in
Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896). It has been rejected by the Court in subse-
quent cases regarding Indians and is now considered a dead doctrine. See United States
v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); Johnson v. Geralds, 234 U.S. 442 (1914); Donnelly v.
United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913); Coyle v. Smith, 211 U.S. 559 (1911).
75. Two Justices, Hill and Ott, concurred separately on the ground that the Indian
fishing right extended only to the use of traditional fishing gear and the defendant had
used a modern 660-foot nylon gill net on the Skagit River. Otherwise these two justices
did not believe the Indian fishing right could be regulated by the state.
Judge Donworth dissented on the ground that the state could not regulate the treaty
right at all and that if regulation was needed "the solution of the problem lies with the
Congress." McCoy, 63 Wn.2d at 456, 387 P.2d at 964 (dissenting opinion). Judge Don-
worth debunked the majority's reliance on Metlakatla Community v. Egan, 369 U.S. 45
(1962), and Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962), both of which involved Indian
challenges to state fishing laws. Judge Donworth pointed out that no treaty was involved
in either case and that the issues there revolved around the construction of federal stat-
utes.
76. 391 U.S. 392 (1968).
77. See text accompanying note 30, supra.
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state to regulate the Indians, they wdre for the most part concerned
with the degree rather than the right of regulation.78 In particular, the
brief of the Department of Justice, signed by the Solicitor General, the
Assistant Attorney General, and others,79 flatly rejected the position
that Indian off-reservation fishing is not subject to state regulation and
urged adoption of the Schoettler-Maison rule that state regulations are
proper where necessary for conservation.80 This brief is especially sig-
nificant because it expressed the position of the United States as
trustee for the Indians, a position that was reflected directly in the
opinion of the court. It presumably demonstrates the judgment of the
United States in its fiduciary capacity as trustee for the Indians on the
question of Indian fishing rights. But no serious attention is given in
the brief or in the opinion to the argument that the Indian fishing right
is outside state regulation unless Congress explicitly so provides. The
brief simply assumed that the Indians can be regulated by the states.
The reason given was that making "accommodations" with the Indi-
ans' rights is "burdensome for some of the states involved." To assist
in carrying this burden the United States argued that the8'
Secretary of Interior, by recent regulations, has undertaken to assume
a large part of the burden. Thus, it is contemplated that the Secretary,
in cooperation with the relevant State authorities and the tribal gov-
ernment, will promulgate appropriate restrictions on off-reservation
fishing by Indians and will furnish identification to those entitled to
exercise treaty rights.
It is unfortunate, indeed, that the United States, in this all impor-
tant brief conceded one of the Indians' most important points without
argument and misled the Court into thinking the Department of In-
terior would soon assume the "burden" of regulating Indian fishing
when very shortly thereafter that department dropped its proposed
regulations.
78. Briefs were filed not only by attorneys for the parties, but also by the states of
Oregon and Idaho (in support of the Washington Game Department position), and by
the Association on American Indian Affairs, the National Congress of American Indi-
ans, the Department of Justice of the United States, and the Confederated Bands and
Tribes of the Yakima Nation.
79. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Puyallup Tribe v. Department of
Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968).
80. Id. at 18. See notes 71-75 and accompanying text, supra.
81. Id. at 10.
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On the basis of these representations and arguments the Court af-
firmed the Washington Supreme Court decision holding that the states
could regulate the Indians, and sent the case back to the trial court to
determine the reasonableness of the particular regulations. The
opinion is short; the key paragraph is set out here:82
The treaty right is in terms the right to fish "at all usual and accus-
tomed places. We assume that fishing by nets was customary at the
time of the Treaty; and we also assume that there were commercial
aspects to that fishing as there are at present. But the manner in which
the fishing may be done and its purpose, whether or not commercial,
are not mentioned in the Treaty. We would have quite a different case
if the Treaty had preserved the right to fish at the "usual and accus-
tomed places" in the "usual and accustomed" manner. But the Treaty
is silent as to the mode or modes of fishing that are guaranteed. More-
over, the right to fish at those respective places is not an exclusive one.
Rather, it is one "in common with all citizens of the Territory." Cer-
tainly the right of the latter may be regulated. And we see no reason
why the right of the Indians may not also be regulated by an appro-
priate exercise of the police power of the State. The right to fish "at all
usual and accustomed" places may, of course, not be qualified by the
State, even though all Indians born in the United States are now citi-
zens of the United States. Act of June 2, 1924, 43 Stat. 253, as su-
perseded by §201(b) of the Nationality Act of 1940, 8 U.S.C. §
1401(a)(2). But the manner of fishing, the size of the take, the restric-
tion of commercial fishing, and the like may be regulated by the State in
the interest of conservation, provided the regulation meets appropriate
standards and does not discriminate against the Indians.
In the above passage, as in the balance of the opinion, the Court gives
only passing notice to the argument that the Indian treaty right is be-
yond state regulation. In effect it backed into the opposite position by
asserting that it "saw no reason" why the states could not regulate the
Indians. But "no reason" is given for this view.
The decision in Puyallup nonetheless stands as a direct holding that
Indian off-reservation fishing is subject to state regulation. The ne-
cessity for either a reversal of this holding or the creation of adequate
standards to guide the states in the exercise of their power is made
clear by the controversies which have arisen since Puyallup.
82. Puyallup Tribe, 391 U.S. at 398.
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IV. RECENT CASES AND THE JUDICIAL QUAGMIRE
What has happened since the Puyallup decision is not surprising.
Confusion and anger among state officials and the Indians are the rule
of the day. The Court's decisions have put both sides in an impossible
position. The states are told that while they cannot charge Indians li-
cense fees for fishing at their usual and accustomed fishing sites they
can otherwise regulate the Indians, but only when "necessary for con-
servation," and only if the regulations meet appropriate standards and
do "not discriminate against the Indians. '83 Neither the "appropriate
standards" nor the guides for non-discrimination are revealed. Nor is
the phrase "necessary for conservation" defined. The Indians, on the
other hand, believe they should not be regulated at all by the states
and, with the states, are equally confused by the other conflicting and
ambiguous rulings handed down by the courts. It is understandable
that the Indians and the states still fight. Neither side is sure of its
legal status. Neither wishes to give any ground under these circum-
stances.
United States v. Oregon (SoHappy v. Smith)84 is indicative of the
continuing confusion over Indian fishing rights. In separate actions,
the United States sued on behalf of several Indian tribes and several
individual Indians to enjoin enforcement of Oregon fishing laws which
allegedly violated Indian treaty rights on the Columbia River. The
complaints alleged that state regulations denied the Indians an effec-
tive fishery at their usual and accustomed fishing grounds and that,
although the regulations permitted non-Indians to make substantial
catches of salmon downstream, they denied the Indians a fair share of
the fish at their traditional upriver fishing sites.
The state of Oregon contended that Indian fishing rights were not
entitled to separate recognition or protection under state law and that
under the Puyallup decision the state could not, even if it wanted to,
allow Indians to fish at different times and places than non-Indians. 85
83. If this standard were applied literally then virtually all non-Indian commercial
and sports fishing would be stopped in Puget Sound and the Straits of Juan de Fuca. The
goal of "conservation" could best be achieved by harvesting salmon at or near the
mouths of their spawning streams--where they are all sorted out. See notes 112-113 and
accompanying text, infra.
84. 302 F.Supp. 899 (D. Ore. 1969).
85. !d. at 907,
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Judge Belloni rejected these contentions, holding that three limitations
constrained state regulation of Indian fishing: (1) the regulations must
be "necessary for the conservation of the fish," 86 (2) the state must
"not discriminate against the Indians," 87 and (3) the regulations must
meet appropriate standards. 88
Judge Belloni noted that many state regulations were designed to
achieve goals other than conservation. He observed that while such
other goals were permissible under state and federal constitutional
law,8 9 when the state is "regulating the federal right of Indians to take
fish at their usual and accustomed places it does not have the same lat-
itude in prescribing the management objectives and the regulatory
means of achieving them." 90 The only state objective that can be used
as a basis for regulating the Indians' right is that concerned with "con-
servation," i.e., the "continued existence of the fish resource."91 This
limitation on state power applies to the gear used by the Indians, as
well as to the times when and places where they can fish. Judge Bel-
loni also rejected the state's contention that the Indians could not fish
at different times and with different gear than non-Indians, noting
that the source of the Indians' right was different than that of the
non-Indians .92
The Judge held that Oregon could no longer "discriminate against
the treaty Indians as it [had] been doing." 93 He noted the institutional
discrimination in the state of Oregon, pointing out that:94
Oregon recognizes sports fishermen and commercial fishermen and
seems to attempt to make an equitable division between the two. But
the state seems to have ignored the rights of the Indians who acquired
a treaty right to fish at their historic off-reservation fishing stations. If
Oregon intends to maintain a separate status of commercial and sports
fisheries it is obvious a third must be added, the Indian fishery.
86. Id. at 908.
87. Id. at 910.
88. The court held that the state had failed to give the Indians adequate notice of
proposed state regulations under the Administrative Procedures Act and thus they had
no real opportunity to comment on those regulations.
89. SoHappy, 302 F.Supp. at 908.
90. Id.
91. Id. "It may use its police power only to the extent necessary to prevent the exer-
cise of that right in a manner that will imperil the continued existence of the fish re-
source."
92. Id. at 911-12.
93. Id. at 910.
94. Id. at 910-11.
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He also noted the "catch" discrimination that resulted from the Ore-
gon regulations, saying that in the future the Indians should be enti-
tled to a "fair share of the fish produced by the Columbia River
system." Under the Puyallup decision "the state- cannot so manage the
fishery that little or no harvestable portion of the run remains to reach
the upper portions of the stream where the historic Indian places are
mostly located. '95 Judge Belloni did not believe his rulings would re-
sult in fewer fish reaching their spawning grounds. Rather, he said:
"The only effect will be that some of the fish now taken by sportsmen
and commercial fishermen must be shared with the treaty Indians, as
our forefathers promised over a hundred years ago."'96
The aftermath of SoHappy demonstrates the difficulty engendered
by the standards stated therein. The parties have been back in court
on numerous occasions since the decision, under the court's con-
tinuing jurisdiction, arguing over virtually each new set of regulations
for Columbia River fishing and over the methods and procedures by
which Oregon handles the fishing rights issue. One of the critical
points of disagreement concerns the meaning of a "fair share" of the
fish, to which the Indians are said to be entitled. 97
Two recent state court decisions on Indian fishing rights further
demonstrate the judicial quagmire created by the United State Su-
preme Court decisions. In People v. Jondreau,98 the defendant, a
full-blooded Chippewa Indian living on the L'Anse Indian Reserva-
tion, was arrested in Michigan for illegal possession of four lake trout
taken from the Keweenaw Bay on Lake Superior. His conviction in
the Baraga Village Justice Court was affirmed by the court of appeals. 99
The Supreme Court of Michigan reversed. The Chippewa Treaty of
1854 provided for the cession to the United States of certain territory
occupied by the Indians, and then provided that the Indians residing
on this territory "shall have the right to hunt and fish therein, until
otherwise ordered by the President."' 00 The court held that the Indians
95. Id. at 911.
96. Id.
97. The court file shows an order entered April 28, 1970, denying plaintiff's motion
for an injunction against enforcement of certain 1970 fishing regulations. A further
motion for a preliminary injunction was filed in July, 1970, on which an order was is-
sued on August 18, 1970. United States v. Oregon, Civil No. 68-409 (D. Ore.). The au-
thor is informed by the attorneys that further proceedings are underway.
98. 384 Mich. 539, 185 N.W.2d 375 (1971).
99. People v. Jondreau, 15 Mich. App. 169, 166 N.W.2d 293 (1968).
100. Treaty with the Chippewas, Sept. 30, 1854, art. XI, 10 Stat. 1109 (1854).
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had a right to fish in Keweenaw Bay, although the bed of the bay was
not specifically included within the described ceded area, on the
ground that the Indians understood they retained such a right and the
treaty should therefore be so construed. The court discussed earlier
cases, especially People v. Chosa,101 (a Michigan case where the court
said the Indians were subject to the same regulations as non-Indians),
Race Horse, Tulee, Schoettler, and Puyallup, and concluded that the
decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Arthur stated the cor-
rect rule. Recognizing that Indian fishing might deplete the state's
fishery resources, the court pointed to the treaty clause which said that
"the President may issue an order limiting or extinguishing the hunting
and fishing rights,"'102 and concluded that the President would take
action if necessary.
The other 1971 case, State v. Moses, arose in Washington.10 3
Moses and other Muckleshoot Indians caught eight steelhead trout,
gamefish under Washington law, in gill nets on the Green River. They
were arrested by State Game Protectors and convicted of illegally fishing
for steelhead with gill nets contrary to RCW 77.16.060, which prov-
ides that "It shall be unlawful for any person to lay, set, use... any
... nets.., in any of the waters of this state with intent thereby to
catch ... any game fish .... "104 The justice court conviction was ap-
pealed de novo to superior court where defendants were again con-
victed. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed in a five to three de-
cision on the ground that the regulation was shown to be "reasonably
necessary for the preservation of the state's fisheries in that river.' 10 5
The majority did not decide whether the Treaty existed, whether de-
fendants were beneficiaries of the Treaty, what was meant by the "in
common" language, the effect of Indian citizenship under 1924 fed-
eral legislation, 10 6 whether treaty fishing rights inure to the benefit of
individual members of the Muckleshoot tribe or only to the tribe as a
101. 252 Mich. 154, 233 N.W. 205 (1930).
102. Jondreau, 185 N.W.2d at 381.
103. 79Wn.2d 104,483 P.2d 832 (1971).
104. WASI. REV. CODE § 77.16.060 (1962).
105. Moses, 79 Wn.2d at 115, 483 P.2d at 838.
106. Act of June 2, 1924, 43 Stat. 253. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970) which now de-
clares:
(a) The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth:...
(2) A person born in the United States to a member of an Indian, Eskimo, Aleu-
tian, or other aboriginal tribe....
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unit, or whether easements over private property exist for the exercise
of those fishing rights. The majority answered only a single question: 107
"Did the state have the power to prohibit totally net fishing for
steelhead trout in the Green River regardless of the Treaty of Point
Elliott of 1855? ' '108 That is, were the regulations in question reason-
ably necessary for conservation? The court said "Yes."
Justice Finley, joined by Justices Neill and Stafford, dissented on
the ground that the state had failed to sustain the burden of proof of
the reasonableness and necessity for the statute in question. He pointed
out that the question of whether the regulations were "reasonably nec-
essary" should not be decided in a "judicial vacuum," as the majority
seemed to do. He noted that many of Washington's so-called con-
107. In Moses, the court did rely upon one other proposition which is patently
wrong, at least in the context of a discussion of a treaty right concerning anadro-
mous fish. The court said that the "fish, while in a state of freedom, are the property
of the sovereign power in whose waters they may be. In the United States it is the
state and not the United States which is the sovereign power in whose waters the
fish are, and the state owns the fish in its sovereign capacity as the representative of
and for the benefit of all people in common." Moses, 79 Wn. 2d at 113, 483 P.2d at
837. The court quotes from WASH. REV. CODE § 77.12.010 (1959), which declares
that wild animals and wild birds and game fish are the "property of the state," and
says this statute is merely declaratory of the already existing law. The opinion relies
on Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), for support of these propositions.
That this ownership theory is wrong, especially when applied to fish that spend most of
their lives outside Washington's jurisdiction and when considered in relation to a treaty
right, has been made abundantly clear by the United States Supreme Court. The lan-
guage in Geer v. Connecticut which is supportive of the Washington Supreme Court
statement above was soundly debunked in Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 400 (1947).
In Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920), the Court said:
The state as we have intimated founds its claim of exclusive authority upon an as-
sertion of title to migratory birds, an assertion that is embodied in statute. No
doubt it is true that as between a State and its inhabitants the State may regulate
the killing and sale of such birds, but it does not follow that its authority is exclu-
sive of paramount powers. To put the claim of the State upon title is to lean upon a
slender reed. Wild birds are not in the possession of anyone; and possession is the
beginning of ownership.
As to the fish that spend only part of their time in a state's waters, the Court noted
in Toomer that some authorities have argued that:
[F] ish and game are the common property of all citizens of the governmental unit
and that the government, as a sort of trustee, exercises this "ownership" for the ben-
efit of all citizens. In the case of fish, it has also been considered that each govern-
ment "owned" both the beds of its lakes, streams, and tidewaters and the waters
themselves; hence it must also "own" the fish within these waters.... The whole
ownership theory in fact, is now generally regarded as but a fiction expressive in
legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve
and regulate the exploitation of an important resource.
Toomer, 334 U.S. at 399-400, 402. The Court then held that state regulation of such
fishery resources must bow to the higher authority of the Constitution. So too, they
must bow to the higher authority of treaty provisions.
108. Moses, 79 Wn.2d at 113,483 P.2d at 837.
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servation laws were aimed at allocating the resource among various
user groups rather than at conservation. He then argued that the
state had failed to carry the burden of proof that these regulations
were necessary for conservation. 109
Two critical points become clear from the above analysis of the
cases. First, neither the United States Supreme Court nor any federal
court has ever faced squarely, or analyzed carefully, the most critical
issue in the conflict; that is, whether the states have any power what-
soever to regulate Indian fishing rights. Second, the standards pro-
nounced to date by the federal and state courts to guide state regulation
of Indian fishing rights are woefully confused, uncertain, and inade-
quate.
V. FUNDAMENTAL DEFECTS IN EXISTING STATE
REGULATION
If the courts persist in holding that the states have power to regulate
Indian off-reservation fishing then they should be prepared to take the
next step and establish meaningful standards by which the states and
the Indians can determine their respective rights. This is a complex
and difficult task, and one that would be better left to Congress. It is,
however, imperative if accommodation is to be reached between the
parties. Certain fundamental issues deserve comment here because of
the way the courts have distorted or ignored them in the past.
One of the most widely misunderstood issues concerns the choice of
goals of the state salmon management programs and the impact that
this choice has on Indian fishery. The popular view, often used to
support state control of the Indians, is that state laws are designed for
the conservation of salmon. The United States Supreme Court seems
to have accepted this view, going so far as to say that the Indian
off-reservation fishery can be regulated by the states only "as ... nec-
essary for conservation."'" 0 We need not be too concerned at this
point with whether "conservation" seeks maximum sustainable phys-
ical yield or maximum economic yield, for in either case the state
109. Id. at 120, 483 P.2d at 840 (Finley, J., dissenting opinion).
110. See Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684 (1942). This language was quoted
with approval in Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968). The
Court in Pityalhip also said that the states can regulate "in the interest of conservation."
391 U.S. at 398.
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programs are sorely deficient. They are actually designed to achieve
three goals, only one of which is conservation. The others are to
spread the catch among a large number of fishermen, and to allocate
the fish among various user groups (purse seiners, trollers, gill netters,
sportsmen and Indians)."' If state management programs were de-
signed primarily to achieve conservation goals the Indians' treaty
rights could easily be accommodated within them. But because of the
other-than-conservation goals discussed below, the rights of the In-
dians are difficult if not impossible to accommodate.
It is a widely known "secret" among fishery biologists (and it was
known to the Indians in the 1850's) that the most efficient method of
catching salmon, both economically and biologically, is to take them
by traps and weirs placed at or near the mouths of spawning streams.
Economically, the fish are best caught at that point because the fish
are tightly schooled up, are at maximum size, and are in prime condi-
tion. Fishing for salmon in the open water is more difficult and more
costly.112
For fishery management purposes the fish are best caught at or near
the mouths of spawning streams, because at that point the runs are
sorted out and the biologists know which fish are headed for which
river and can tell precisely how many fish should be caught from each
run. River by river management is important because one run may be
so small that all fish should escape for spawning whereas another
run may be so large that 85 percent or more can safely be harvested.113
When the fish are in the open waters of the ocean, the Straits of
111. For comments on these different goals see W. ROYCE, D. BEVAN, J.
CRUTCHFIELD, G. PAULIK, & R. FLETCHER, SALMON GEAR LIMITATION IN NORTHERN
WASHINGTON WATERS (1963); Johnson, Regulation of Commercial Salmon Fishermen,
A Case of Confused Objectives, 55 PACIFIC NORTHWEST QUARTERLY 141 (1964).
Judge Belloni, in United States v. Oregon (SoHappy v. Smith), 302 F.Supp. 899 (D.
Ore. 1969), said "Oregon's conservation policies are concerned with allocation and use
of the state's fish resource as well as with their perpetuation." Id. at 909. In State v.
Moses, 79 Wn. 2d 104, 483 P. 2d 832 (1971), Justice Finley pointed out that the distribu-
tion of a scarce resource among competing users "must necessarily be achieved by some
system of allocation" and that "[s] tate conservation laws are fundamentally laws of
allocation as well as preservation." Id. at 127, 483 P.2d at 844.
112. Interestingly, the super-efficient traps and weirs are banned by law, as are
sonar, monofilament gillnets, and spotter aircraft. And fishermen are frequently allowed
to fish only one or two days per week. The reason for such rules is to spread the catch
among a larger number of fishermen. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 220-20-015 (1),
232-12-150(1) (1970); WASH. REV. CODE § 75.12.280 (1959).
113. See R. VAN CLEVE & R. JOHNSON, MANAGEMENT OF THE HIGH SEAS FISHERIES OF
THE NORTHEASTERN PACIFIC 17 (1963).
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Juan de Fuca, or Puget Sound, the various runs are mixed together. A
commercial fisherman who drops his nets in the Straits does not know
if he is catching salmon headed toward the Fraser River in Canada,
the Puyallup, Nisqually, Skagit, or some other river in Washington. If
enough boats happen onto a school of fish they can easily overfish it,
taking too many of the run headed for the Nisqually, for example, and
missing entirely the run headed for the Skagit. It is virtually impos-
sible to distinguish the salmon of one run from another, even if the
fisherman wanted to. On the other hand, when the fish have arrived at
the mouths of their spawning streams they are all sorted out. The biol-
ogist, or the fisherman, knows that fish caught there are headed for
spawning grounds in that stream.
If salmon were harvested only at the mouths of their spawning
streams then the state could easily assure that a certain, substantial
percent were allowed to proceed up the river to the Indians' fishing
sites.
State programs are also designed to allocate the salmon among var-
ious user groups. There are two principal means of accomplishing
this: by a "zoning" system under which the state determines where
fishing can take place, and by regulations determining the type of
fishing gear that can be used. As for the zoning system, unfortunately
the Indians find themselves in the worst possible zone. Under the zone
system, generally only sports fishermen and commercial trollers are
permitted to fish at sea, beyond the three-mile territorial limit. Gill net-
ters, reefnetters, and purse seiners are permitted in the Straits of Juan
de Fuca. Sportsmen and gill netters can fish in Puget Sound, with each
type of fisherman excluded from certain areas and all fishermen ex-
cluded from waters near the river mouths.114 Most of the Indians'
usual and accustomed fishing sites are on or very near the rivers. As
the fish move toward the river each of the non-Indian groups takes
part of the run. The zoning system permits the non-Indian commer-
cial and sports fishermen to get the first crack at the fish. By the time
the fish enter the rivers and move toward the Indian fishing sites, there
are few left to catch; those remaining are needed for spawning.
114. This describes the general type of regulation, although the actual regulations
are much more detailed and contain a variety of complex exceptions. See WASHINGTON
DEP'T. OF FISHERIES, SUMMARY OF REGULATIONS PERTAINING TO ALL PUGET SOUND
SALNION NET FISHERIES (1971).
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These factors are especially significant in view of the Court's pro-
nouncement that the Indian fishery can be regulated only "as... neces-
sary for conservation." If the Supreme Court means what it says then
substantial revamping of state regulatory programs may have to occur
to give proper recognition to Indian fishing rights. The courts have,
unfortunately, refused to accept the fact that fishery management pro-
grams serve other than conservation goals. So long as the courts refuse
to recognize the real objectives of these programs, their decisions will
remain on the perimeter of the problem and will not effect meaningful
standards or remedies.
One last aspect of state regulation must be noted. This concerns the
relative political power of the three principal user groups of salmon:
commercial fishermen, sports fishermen, and Indians. Washington has
long recognized the first two groups through the creation of a Fish-
eries Department'1 5 and a Game Department, 116 as has Oregon by its
creation of the Fish Commission"17 and the Game Commission." 8
The political strength of these groups and their supporting coalitions
is well known. Indians do not have such strength, as evidenced by the
absence of state departments of Indian fisheries or any other state
governmental entities charged with the protection of the Indians' in-
terests. Nor is it reasonable to argue that the fisheries and game de-
partments adequately meet this responsibility. By training they are
biologists and by education, professional contact, and peer group as-
sociation they reflect the views, attitudes and interests of the commer-
cial and sports fishermen. The record of their policies has consistently
been adverse to the Indians." 9
CONCLUSION
Without reason or analysis, the United States Supreme Court has
held that the states have the power to regulate Indian off-reservation
115. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 75.08.080, 75.04.040 (1962); WASH. ADMIN. CODE §
200-12-010 (1969).
116. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 77.08.020, 79.12.040 (1962).
117. See ORE. REV. STAT. § 506.036.040 (1969).
118. Id. § 496.160 (1969).
119. See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY:
FISHING RIGHTS OF THE MUCKLESHOOT, PUYALLUP, AND NISQUALLY INDIANS 125
(1970).
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fishing when necessary for conservation. The result has been the con-
tinuation of state regulatory systems which consistently deny the In-
dians the opportunity on which their livelihood depends, the right to
fish at the usual and accustomed places off the reservation as guaran-
teed by treaty. There are two solutions to the problem.
First, the Court should apply well-established principles of constitu-
tional law and hold that off-reservation Indian fishing is not subject to
state control until Congress expressly delegates such power to the
states. When that rule is established, the states and the Indians should
negotiate a management program that will provide a fair distribution
of the catch among the various user groups. If a management pro-
gram cannot be established by cooperation between the states and the
Indians, Congress should create one, after full and careful consulta-
tion with Indians, sportsmen and commercial fishermen.
Second, if the Court persists in upholding state regulation, it should
take the next step and define rational and fair standards for the recog-
nition of the Indians' rights. This can only be accomplished by recog-
nizing that conservation is only one of three goals now served by state
management systems, that the conservation goal is not the principal
impediment to recognition of Indian rights, and that the main diffi-
culty comes from laws designed to spread the salmon among a large
number of fishermen and to allocate the catch among various user
groups. When the Court recognizes these facts, and only then, will it
be able to move toward a meaningful accommodation of the rights of
the parties.
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